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 1 
Police governance and accountability in Scotland following 
reform: Revisiting the policy rationale for the creation of the 
Scottish Police Authority  
 
Abstract 
This article critically assesses the policy discourse for police reform in Scotland, specifically 
focusing on the rationale for the creation of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA). Through a 
chronological review of official policy reports and consultations that took place prior to the 
2012 Act, and by drawing on a select number of interviews1 conducted as part of the wider 
study (Malik, 2017a), I argue that while austerity became the catalyst for change, police 
reform in Scotland was strongly supported by concerns around weak police governance 
arrangements. The SPA was created to strengthen financial oversight, to provide enhanced 
focus on national policing requirements and to bring in professional governance 
competencies and expertise that the local police authorities lacked. In the five years since 
reform, the SPA has continued to struggle to address these weaknesses. Furthermore, the 
official reform agenda neglected the need for robust mechanisms for accountability of 
operational policing. This omission manifested in the most abrasive fashion following the 
2012 Act as cases such as stop and search and armed policing highlighted the inadequacies 
of the new police governance arrangements. In order that the SPA can fulfil its intended 
purpose, it needs to enhance its capacity and focus on providing holistic mechanisms for 
police governance that incorporate financial oversight and robust accountability of 
operational policing.  
Keywords 
Police Governance, Accountability, Police reform, Scottish Police Authority, Police Scotland 
Introduction 
The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (henceforth, the 2012 Act) came into effect 
on 1 April 2013, bringing about a seismic shift to the policing and police governance 
landscape of Scotland. Five years on, the effects of the 2012 Act still reverberate today as 
the Scottish Police Authority (the SPA), under the leadership of its third chair, look to appoint 
the third chief constable for the Police Service of Scotland (Police Scotland). In this article, I 
firstly map out the powers and responsibilities of the key actors involved in the post-2012 
Act governance arrangements and provide a chronological analysis of the official policy 
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discourse leading up to the 2012 Act. By drawing on a select number of interviews with 
stakeholders across the Scottish policing landscape, including a former Minister, I critically 
assess the policy discourse and distil the nuances of the rationale for the current police 
governance arrangements and the creation of the SPA. I argue that while austerity provided 
a strong impetus for police reform, the official policy agenda sought to strengthen police 
governance in relation to the allocation of resources, local service delivery, and national 
policing requirements. The policy discourse also highlighted the need for expertise in police 
governance and it was deemed that the SPA would provide the necessary governance 
competencies and professional skills that the previous local police authorities lacked. 
However, the need for robust mechanisms of accountability of operational policing was 
neglected.  I argue that this omission has resulted in inadequate police governance and 
accountability arrangements, particularly manifesting in the SPA’s inability to hold the police 
to account since the 2012 Act came into effect.  
The landscape of police governance  
Prior to the new arrangements, police governance in Scotland was managed through a 
tripartite structure under which responsibilities and powers of governance were shared 
between central government, local government, through the local police authorities, and chief 
constables. The 2012 Act replaced the previous tripartite model with a multifaceted approach 
Figure 1 - A snapshot of the distribution of powers following the 2012 Act 
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to police governance and accountability. While the SPA occupies a central role in the new 
police governance arrangements, there are other key actors with varying degrees of power 
and influence in the new governance landscape (see fig. 1 for a snapshot): 
 
The Police Service of Scotland  
Police Scotland replaced the eight former regional police forces, the Scottish Crime and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (SCDEA), and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland 
(ACPOS). It is led by a corporate executive team of senior police officers of rank assistant 
chief constable and above, and senior civilian police staff, under the leadership of a single 
chief constable. There are thirteen local policing divisions across the thirty-two local authority 
areas, each led by a local divisional commander. Further, there are three Regional Command 
Areas, led by an assistant chief constable, corresponding to the North, West and East regions 
of Scotland. In addition, specialist services such as counter terrorism and investigations of 
major crimes are delivered by the Specialist Crime Division (SCD), and Operational Support 
Divisions provide support functions such as Roads Policing, Air support, Dog branch, 
Mounted Branch and Marine Policing. The 2012 Act places the direction and control of all of 
the police organisation under the domain of the chief constable (s.17(2)(a)), who is also 
responsible for the day to day administration of the police service (s.17(2)(b)). Crucially, by 
virtue of s.17, police officers of any rank, including the civilian staff, in exercising their 
functions are also subject to the direction and control of the chief constable (s.21), and it is 
the chief constable who is liable for any unlawful conduct by a constable in respect of their 
functions (s.24(1)). The chief constable has to prepare an annual police plan (s.35) and have 
regard to any comments received on the draft plan by the SPA (s.35(3)).  
The Scottish Police Authority  
The SPA replaced the former local police authorities, and it occupies a central role in the new 
landscape of police governance. The SPA is the legal employer of Police Scotland. It has 
statutory responsibility to maintain the police service (s.3) and it is the only body with formal 
statutory powers to hold the chief constable to account (s.2(1)(e)). As it is the SPA’s duty to 
allocate police budgets, it has to pay damages in case of unlawful conduct by constables 
under the direction of the chief constable (s.24(3)). The SPA also has powers to appoint the 
chief constable, deputy chief constables and assistant chief constables (s.7(1)). However, the 
appointment of the chief constable has to be approved by the Scottish Ministers (s.7(2)), and 
the appointments of other senior officers have to be made following consultation with the 
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chief constable (s.7(3)). Similarly, the SPA can require a chief constable to resign or retire in 
the interests of efficiency or effectiveness, but it must do so following consultation with the 
Scottish Ministers (s.14 (2)(c)). The SPA also has a duty to prepare a strategic police plan, 
setting out the main objectives for the policing of Scotland (s.34), the chief constable’s annual 
police plan has to give cognisance to the strategic police plan (s.35(2)(b)). 
 
 
Scottish Government  
The Scottish Ministers have formal powers throughout the various sections of the 2012 Act, 
maintaining a check on the powers of the SPA and the chief constable. Section 5 of the 2012 
Act allows the Scottish Ministers to give directions to the SPA, however, the direction may 
not be about a specific operation carried out by Police Scotland (s.5(2)). The Scottish 
Ministers also have powers to determine strategic police priorities (s.33(1)), which the SPA 
has to take into account when developing the strategic police plan. Schedule 1 of the 2012 
Act, also lays out the powers of the Scottish Ministers to appoint the chair of the SPA, and 
to appoint between ten and fourteen members, as well as formal powers to remove members 
if certain conditions are satisfied.  
The Scottish Parliament 
The 2012 Act (s.124(1)) requires the Scottish Parliament to make arrangements for keeping 
under review the operation of the police reform legislation. Following the passing of the 2012 
Act, the Justice Committee comprising of a cross-party membership took responsibility of 
fulfilling the requirements of the Act and conducted several meetings on matters relating to 
police reform and the new governance arrangements. The Parliament established the Justice 
Sub-Committee on Policing on 13 March 2013 due to the ‘legislative workload’ of the Justice 
Committee (Scottish Parliament, 2014: 1). The Justice Sub-Committee on Policing has 
played a significant role in delivering public accountability of the police and the SPA, reporting 
on issues including armed policing, local policing, stop and search and the adequacy (or 
inadequacy) of the new police governance arrangements. In April 2018, five years since the 
reforms came into effect, the Justice Committee initiated post-legislative scrutiny of the 2012 
Act to examine whether the policy objectives of the 2012 Act have been achieved.   
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) 
The role and powers of HMICS were retained and extended in the 2012 Act (s.71). HMICS 
has formal powers to not only conduct inquiries about any matter relating to Police Scotland, 
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but also the SPA. The Scottish Ministers also have powers to direct HMICS to carry out an 
inspection into anything they deem to be relevant (s.74).  Since 2012, HMICS has carried out 
thematic inspections on local policing, armed policing, stop and search, call handling centres 
and openness and transparency within the SPA. The myriad inspection reports published by 
HMICS have been drawn on extensively by the Scottish Parliament and they have served as 
a necessary evidence-base for informed scrutiny of Police Scotland.  
Audit Scotland 
The 2012 Act (s.37) places a statutory obligation on both Police Scotland, and the SPA to 
secure ‘best value’, giving due regard to the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, economy 
and meeting the requirements of providing equal opportunities (s.37(4)). By virtue of s.37, the 
Auditor General for Scotland is responsible for auditing the SPA (s.42) and Police Scotland 
(s.43). The Auditor General is independent of the Scottish Government and reports directly 
to the Scottish Parliament. Since 2012, Audit Scotland has identified various weaknesses in 
the new police governance arrangements, and more recently it criticised the SPA for financial 
mismanagement and improper governance and oversight (Audit Scotland, 2017). 
Local Scrutiny Committees 
The provision of local policing was made a statutory requirement by the 2012 Act, requiring 
the chief constable to appoint a local commander for each local authority area (s.44). Whilst 
the Act did not prescribe how the local scrutiny arrangements would be organised, it did give 
powers to local authorities to determine local policing priorities in partnership with the local 
commander, and to approve the local police plan (s.47). Crucially, the powers of police 
funding, and maintenance of the local police forces, previously enjoyed by the local police 
authorities were passed to the SPA. Under the new governance arrangements, the role of the 
local authorities has been to ‘monitor’ and ‘provide feedback’ to the local commander on the 
performance of local policing (s.45(2)). The local commander is required to involve the local 
authority in setting the local policing priorities (s.45(1)) and to participate in community 
planning (s.46). Since 2012, all thirty-two local authorities have made arrangements for local 
scrutiny, in the form of local scrutiny committees (see Henry, Malik and Aitchison, 2016).  
The Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (PIRC) 
PIRC is the main organisation responsible for handling complaints against individual police 
officers and it has powers to investigate the most serious incidents involving the police (s.62). 
PIRC replaced the previous Police Complaints Commissioner for Scotland (PCCS) and it is 
organisationally independent of Police Scotland and the SPA. PIRC is under the jurisdiction 
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of the Lord Advocate of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, responsible for all 
prosecutions in Scotland.  The 2012 Act (s.65) gives powers to PIRC to initiate investigations 
in relation to any policing related matter, that may be of public interest. PIRC also has a 
statutory duty to keep under review the complaints handling processes of both Police 
Scotland and the SPA.  
The roadmap to the 2012 Act 
The early modern police forces in Scotland developed locally at the behest of local 
administrations, with minimal central government legislation (Gordon, 1980; Barrie, 2012; 
Davidson, Jackson and Smale, 2016).  Despite local beginnings, policing scholars have 
identified a consistent trend towards greater centralisation of policing and police governance 
(Donnelly and Scott, 2002: 12-13; Scott, 2011). The 2012 Act and the creation of Police 
Scotland and the SPA represent the culmination of this trend. Whilst the process of 
amalgamation of the eight legacy police forces into a single service was rapid (Fyfe, 2014) 
my analysis of the official policy discourse shows that the 2012 Act itself followed a 
considerably lengthy period of reviews and consultations.  
 
The Scottish Parliamentary elections of 2007 and the formation of the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) led minority government triggered a sequence of events, consultations, reviews and 
▪ May, 2007 - Scottish National Party win the Scottish Parliamentary elections and form a 
minority government 
▪ January, 2008 - Justice Committee Inquiry report into the effective use of police resources 
▪ January, 2009 - Independent Review of Policing in Scotland 
▪ November, 2009 - Scottish Policing Board set up following the Independent Review 
recommendations 
▪ October, 2010 - Sustainable Policing sub-group set up in anticipation of the UK Spending 
Review 
▪ February, 2011 - Scottish Government Consultation on the future of policing 
▪ March, 2011 - Sustainable policing sub-group, Phase Two Report: Options for Reform 
▪ May, 2011 - HMICS publish paper on police governance and accountability 
▪ June, 2011 - Christie Commission publish recommendations on efficient public service 
delivery  
▪ September, 2011 - Scottish Government Consultation on amalgamation of the police 
forces 
▪ September, 2011 - Scottish Government publish Police Reform Outline Business Case 
▪ January, 2012 - The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Bill introduced in the Scottish 
Parliament 
▪ August, 2012 - The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act received Royal Assent 
▪ April, 2013 - The single service, 'Police Scotland' and the SPA come into effect 
Box 1 - Timeline of events leading up to the 2012 Act 
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inspections (see Box 1), that involved a broad range of stakeholders including the Scottish 
Parliament, the now defunct Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS), 
representatives and convenors of local police authorities, HMICS, the Audit Commissioner, 
civil servants, and academics. Each report, committee and commission through its 
recommendations sought to address the weaknesses in the governance structures that 
existed since the last comprehensive review of policing in Britain that was conducted by the 
Royal Commission on Policing in 1962. The following sections offer a brief timeline of events 
and recommendations made by the various stakeholders in the lead up to the Police and Fire 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2012.  
The Justice Committee Report (2008)   
During the 2007 election campaign, the SNP made a pledge to recruit more police officers 
(SNP, 2007: 58). Following the formation of a SNP minority government, the newly formed 
Justice Committee commenced an inquiry with an initial remit to ‘review the use of police 
resources in Scotland including plans by the Scottish Government to provide for an additional 
1000 police officers’ (Justice Committee, 2008: para. 3). The Justice Committee broadened 
its remit soon after it initiated the review and the final report published in 2008 included 
recommendations on all aspects of policing and police governance, including the purpose 
and priorities for policing in Scotland and the effectiveness of the tripartite governance 
arrangements (Ibid. para. 5). In particular, the Justice Committee recommended that the roles 
and responsibilities of all actors within the tripartite relationship should be clarified (Ibid. para. 
349), the composition of local police authorities should be reviewed to include independently 
appointed advisors with a range of professional skills and expertise (Ibid. para. 351), the local 
police authorities should ensure they have sufficient support and analytical capacity to 
independently scrutinise the performance of the police (Ibid. para. 353), and that local police 
authorities should make themselves more visible to local communities, promote dialogue with 
the electorate and effectively communicate local priorities for policing (Ibid. para. 354). As 
part of the recommendations, the Justice Committee also called for a thorough independent 
review of Scottish policing in appreciation of the fact that there had not been a 
comprehensive review of policing and police governance arrangements in Scotland since the 
Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (Ibid. para. 364).  
Independent Review of Policing in Scotland (2009) 
The HMICS review took the findings and recommendations of the Justice Committee’s report 
(2008) as the point of departure and conducted a holistic review into the roles and 
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responsibilities of police forces in Scotland. The review looked at all aspects of Scottish 
policing and one of its stated objectives were to ‘make recommendations for the 
organisation, governance and accountability of police forces in Scotland’ (Tomkins, 2009: 9).  
 
The HMICS report reemphasised the ambiguities in the existing tripartite structure of 
governance and found that the local police authorities had very little influence over local 
policing decisions that were usually made through the community planning partnerships and 
Single Outcome Agreements2 (SOAs) (Ibid. para. 1.17). The local police authorities also 
lacked independent support to enable them to scrutinise and challenge police operational 
policies effectively (Ibid. para. 1.18). Further, there was no statutory requirement for the local 
police authorities to consider national policing requirements such as counter terrorism, 
cybercrime and organised crime, and chief constables were bound by legislation ‘to give 
primacy to the decisions of local police authority’ (Ibid. para. 1.19). The report also highlighted 
serious gaps in governance over national policing decisions due to a lack of formal 
mechanisms to hold ACPOs to account as a collective body. As part of its recommendations, 
HMICS proposed the creation of a national steering group (they referred to as the Policing in 
Scotland Steering Group or PSSG) to oversee national strategy and collaborate with partners 
of the existing tripartite arrangement to respond to national policing risks (Tomkins, 2009: 51-
53).  
 
In 2007, a Scottish Police Services Authority (SPSA) had already been established to ‘improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of services which support Scottish policing’ (Audit Scotland, 
2010: 1). However, the SPSA did not have a governance role over any of the eight local police 
forces, it provided specialist support services such as forensics, fingerprint and DNA analysis 
to the police and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service.   
 
Following the Independent Review by HMICS, the Cabinet Secretary responded by setting 
up a Scottish Policing Board (SPB) in November 2009, membership of which consisted of 
the Scottish Government, Chair of the Police Authorities Conveners’ Forum, three nominated 
Conveners of the local police authorities, ACPOS President, Vice President, a third Chief 
Constable nominated by ACPOS, and local authority representatives (Scottish Government, 
2009: para. 9).  
Sustainable Policing Sub-group (2010) 
In anticipation of the UK Government’s Spending Review for years 2011 to 2015, the SPB 
members, on request of the Cabinet Secretary for Justice, initiated a programme of work in 
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June 2010 in order to identify a sustainable policing model for Scotland (Scottish Policing 
Board, 2010a: 1). By October 2010, a Sustainable Policing Sub-group (SPSG) was formed 
with a remit to ‘develop rigorously appraised options for further cost savings to enable 
frontline policing outcomes to be sustained in 2013-14 and beyond, in the face of anticipated 
spending reductions’ (Scottish Government, 2010: 1).  
 
The SPSG submitted its interim report in November 2010, and among many early 
considerations it explored three structures of policing; a more streamlined local force model, 
a regional model and a single service (SPSG, 2010: 22-25). Three tiers of accountability 
concomitant to the three structures were also proposed. Firstly, at the multi-member ward 
level, through the community councils as the first tier to hold operational policing to account 
(Ibid. para. 3.15). Secondly, at the local authority level and embedded within the existing 
community planning partnership structures and SOAs, particularly through the delivery of 
jointly agreed outcomes (Ibid. para. 3.16). And nationally through a ‘Scottish Police Authority 
should a single force be created’, with existing bodies like the SPB to co-ordinate national 
priorities and strategic objectives (Ibid. para. 3.17). This was the first mention of a national 
accountability body that would work alongside the SPB but operate as an independent body.  
 
The interim report was presented at the SPB meeting in December 2010 which was attended 
by the SPB members, the SPSG project team, representatives from local authorities, ACPOS, 
HMICS, officials from the Scottish Government, some conveners of the local police 
authorities and joint boards, members of the Association of Scottish Police Superintendents 
(ASPS) and the Scottish Police Federation (SPF). Due to a range of options requiring further 
exploration, the SPB members could not reach a consensus and the Cabinet Secretary for 
Justice took forward the proposed local, regional and national models to the Cabinet for 
further consideration (Scottish Policing Board, 2010b: 4).  
Scottish Government Consultation on the future of policing (February 2011) 
In terms of the roadmap towards a centralised police service, 2011 proved to be the busiest 
year for all stakeholders involved in the Scottish policing landscape. Following the early work 
conducted by the SPB and the subsequent SPSG, the Scottish Government embarked on a 
wide-ranging consultation process asking stakeholders to provide written responses to 12 
questions based around ‘improving services and delivering improved outcomes; 
accountability and engagement, especially in relation to local communities; and delivering 
efficiencies while protecting frontline services’ (Scottish Government, 2011a: 5). The 
 10 
consultation also sought views on the three proposed structures, that is ‘significantly 
enhanced collaboration between the existing eight forces; a rationalised regional model; and 
a single service’ (Ibid.).  
Sustainable Policing Sub-group, Phase Two Report: Options for Reform (March 2011) 
A month after the Scottish Government issued its consultation document, the SPSG reported 
to the SPB with its phase two report with further evidence for a viable model of policing going 
forward. In exploring the three models, the SPSG expressed their support for the single 
service (SPSG, 2011: para. 15).  
 
As the SPSG’s work gained momentum in identifying the most efficient and effective 
structure for the future delivery of policing in Scotland, the Scottish Government reiterated 
its desire to improve governance and accountability of policing in Scotland whichever 
structure was adopted. There was widespread recognition within the policy circles that whilst 
the local police forces were actively contributing to the community planning partnerships and 
SOAs, ‘there were few formal mechanisms for holding the police to account at the local 
authority level’ (Scottish Government, 2011b: 2, para. 11).  
 
The Scottish Government also asked the SPSG to consider formal structures to strengthen 
national accountability. In the event of amalgamation, two models were particularly being 
explored; one where the chief constable would be directly answerable to the relevant 
Minister, providing direct democratic accountability; or a second where the chief constable 
would be answerable to a National Policing Board or Authority with powers to allocate funds, 
appoint chief officers and approve strategic plans (Scottish Government, 2011b: 3, para. 15). 
Further, whilst appreciating the need for formal local and national structures and mechanisms 
of accountability, the Scottish Government also showed an interest in strengthening 
accountability through ‘engagement and dialogue, information provision and performance 
reporting and the use of web and social media’ (Scottish Government, 2011b: 4, para. 18).  
HMICS’ Discussion Paper on Governance and Accountability of Policing in Scotland 
(May 2011)  
The Scottish Government’s concerns about a lack of formal mechanisms for local and 
national accountability were endorsed once again by HMICS.  A report published by HMICS 
in 2011 showed recognised the weaknesses in the tripartite arrangements that the Justice 
Committee (2008) and the Independent Review (Tomkins, 2009) had previously alluded to. 
The HMICS review went as far as saying that the ‘fundamental problems raised by the Royal 
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Commission in 1962 had never been addressed and the complex competencies required for 
governance and accountability of the police had never been made available’ (Laing and 
Fossey, 2011: 14). Among the recommendations, it was proposed that any future structure 
of policing should ‘develop a fuller system of governance incorporating the wider skills, 
knowledge, competences, capabilities and capacity necessary to draw policing more fully to 
account’ (Ibid. p. 15). 
 
The discourses up to the May 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections, even while the shadow 
of austerity loomed, strongly supported police reform and the most important rationale for 
change at the time was the weak governance and accountability structure and the underlying 
ambiguities of tripartism that had not been addressed in over four decades. However, it was 
the economic debate, and the need to develop a sustainable policing model that ultimately 
became the catalyst for change.   
Christie Commission (June 2011) 
The debates and consultations around the future delivery of policing in Scotland were being 
conducted at a time when, in light of the UK Government’s spending review, the Scottish 
Government had commissioned a much broader consultation on the future delivery of public 
services. It was in this context that the Scottish Parliamentary elections were contested in 
2011. Despite the impending public services review being undertaken by the Christie 
Commission, the SNP pledged to maintain the 1000 extra police officers that they had initially 
promised in 2007 whilst also suggesting a reduction in the number of forces (SNP, 2011: 18), 
stopping short of pledging full support for a single service. The Scottish Labour (Scottish 
Labour, 2011: 47-48) and the Scottish Conservatives (Scottish Conservatives, 2011: 20) 
outright supported a single service, while the Scottish Liberal Democrats (Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, 2011: 72) and the Scottish Greens opposed it (Scottish Greens, 2011: 22). 
 
The responsibility of reforming the police in Scotland fell on the SNP following a majority win 
and despite their initial reluctance, the momentum towards a single police service hastened 
following the publication of Christie’s report. Christie made recommendations of greater 
integration between not just the police forces but in terms of wider public service delivery 
provision (Christie, 2011: 43), a reduction in duplication and sharing of resources for greater 




While the focus of the report was on all public services, the findings further strengthened the 
case for police reform. Christie emphasised that any reform needs to ensure that ‘services 
are required to account to the people and communities of Scotland, both directly and through 
their democratically elected representatives’ (Christie, 2011: 76, para. 8.24). However, as 
HMICS (Laing and Fossey, 2011) and the Justice Committee (2008) had previously observed, 
the weaknesses in tripartism particularly at the local authority level were not due to a lack of 
democratic control but due to a lack of professional governance competencies, and capacity.   
Police Reform Programme Outline Business Case (September 2011) 
The results of the first consultation conducted by the Scottish Government in February 2011 
showed very limited support for a single service. Only 22 respondents out of a possible 225 
supported a single service, 45 favoured a rationalised regional model, 59 preferred the eight 
local force model and 77 chose no option due to insufficient evidence and information (Bryan, 
Granville, and Sizer 2011: 26). Contrary to the official policy discourse, 50 per cent of the 
respondents noted that the existing governance and accountability arrangements were 
working well (Ibid. p. 15). The respondents who did not favour a single force model expressed 
concerns that centralisation would result in a ‘loss of local knowledge in terms of needs, 
geography, training and skills and a consequent negative impact on services; and a loss of 
local accountability and democracy’ (Ibid. p. 42).  
 
Despite such unfavourable results, the Scottish Government formally announced its intention 
to create a single police service in September 2011 and initiated another round of 
consultations to inform the legislative framework for the reform bill. The announcement came 
after the SPB had responded to the concerns raised in the first consultation with proposals 
that local policing will be made a statutory requirement and local accountability will be 
strengthened by giving powers to local authorities to ‘approve the local police plan, scrutinise 
local policing performance and to hold the local senior officer to account for local policing’ 
(SPB, 2011: 2, para. 8-9). The proposals in the second round of consultation included the 
creation of a centralised governing body of independently appointed members; the Scottish 
Police Authority (SPA). The SPA was envisaged to provide governance and accountability of 
the new single service without interference from Scottish Ministers and it was reiterated that 
the chief constable would be directly answerable to the SPA (Scottish Government 2011c: 
13, para. 3.9). The proposals also recognised that the composition of the SPA would have to 
be broad and reflect a range of competencies and skills.  
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The proposals also included measures to strengthen local policing and local accountability 
by allowing each of the thirty-two local authorities to monitor and scrutinise police 
performance against the local police plan and to seek reports, answers and explanations 
from the local commander about the plan or any other local policing issues (Scottish 
Government 2011c: 15, para 3.20). Crucially, the Scottish Government did not intend to 
legislate a single way for local authorities to formalise their proposed local scrutiny functions, 
it was left to the local councillors to determine the most appropriate mechanism and to form 
a relationship with their local commanders to secure delivery of local outcomes (Ibid. p. 16, 
para 3.21).  
 
Along with the consultation document, the Scottish Government also issued an outline 
business case for a single service proposing that ‘it provides the least complex and most 
efficient option; the best opportunity to reinvest to improve local policing outcomes; the 
highest potential for long-term financial sustainability; and the best opportunity to co-ordinate 
change, optimise benefit and minimise risk’ (Scottish Government, 2011d: 9).  
 
The above chronological review highlights the protracted period of discussions that preceded 
the 2012 Act. The review of the official policy discourse also helps develop a nuanced 
understanding of the rationale for police reform and the current police governance 
arrangements, in particular, the creation of the SPA. I distil and examine the key themes in 
relation to the latter below.      
 
Police reform in context 
Austerity 
In the ‘age of austerity’ (Neyroud, 2012: 315), the primary driver for the Scottish police reform 
was the concern around public service spending following the UK Government Spending 
Review, and an overall reduction in Scotland’s devolved budget (HM Treasury, 2010: 70). As 
of 2011-12, according to the Scottish Government, policing in Scotland cost the economy a 
total of £1.4 billion per annum (Scottish Government, 2011c: 18, para. 4.1). With all estimates 
suggesting that the public service spending was not expected to return to 2010 levels for 16 
years (Christie, 2011: viii), inaction was not an option.  
 
HMICS’ Independent Review raised concerns very early on, that local police forces, 
particularly the smaller ones, were facing financial pressures (Tomkins, 2009: 4, para. 1.7). It 
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was anticipated that while the larger forces such as Strathclyde would have been able to 
deliver savings through a reduction in corporate and civilian staff, smaller forces may be 
forced to reduce front line provision, a measure that was perceived to have drastic effects on 
communities in areas served by those smaller forces (Scottish Government, 2011a: 11, para. 
23). While some local police forces were struggling to provide resources for front line 
community policing, due to the changing demands on policing and new threats such as 
terrorism, others like Grampian and Lothian and Borders raised specific concerns about 
having insufficient resources to police the oil industry and the Capital respectively (Justice 
Committee, 2008: paras. 56, 57).  
 
In order to provide the necessary savings, it was considered prudent to integrate specialist 
services and resources and to avoid duplication as proposed by Christie (2011). Of all the 
options presented, a single force was decided to have been the most efficient with an 
estimated savings of £151m per annum (Scottish Government, 2011d: 54, para. 5.32). 
Despite a long period of consultations, the pace of the reform, once the option to move 
towards a single force was chosen, was remarkable. A civil servant involved in the reform 
programme told me that work was already in progress on managing the pressures of financial 
cuts on the local police forces, however, when the extent of the cuts became clear, there was 
a sense that a structural change was necessary: 
 
Wow, suddenly there is going to be a significant reduction in budget. That started to 
focus their minds…the whole thing was very quick, in a sense that, we knew that we 
had to keep the momentum up of this work and there was a pressing need to take it 
forward. (Interview: civil servant). 
 
An early suggestion of a single force was rejected, however, it was felt very early in the 
discussions that centralisation would be the most cost-effective option: 
 
well there was a strong sort of evidence base for that [single service] … at the very 
first meeting of the SPB, the chair of Strathclyde Police Authority made a point of 
raising the issue of a single force… so it was not that there weren’t people talking 
about it even back then. (Interview: civil servant). 
 
In the period leading up to the 2012 Act, the reform team also took cognisance of police 
reform programmes in other jurisdictions. A former Minister who was initially reluctant about 




We looked long and hard at this, because the first option was: do you go to regional 
services … and I always remember what persuaded me not to go down regional 
services was speaking to those in Finland who had been through reform. In Finland, 
they said we reformed from 30 or 40 [police forces] and we brought it down to 9 or 
10 and they said we now have to move on [to a single service]. And they said if you 
are going to reform then do it once and I took that on board, I thought there was a 
logic there, if we had gone to 3 or 4 East, West, North as was kind of proposed, you 
would not have made any significant savings or the savings would have been 
significantly less. And the lesson that we learned from Finland, and I think that was 
the evidence, that we would have to move on to a single service pretty quickly. If you 
were going to [reform the police], you do it once so that was the driver there. 
(Interview: former Minister).  
 
The Finnish example by the former Minister in the above quote underlines the fact that the 
police reform in Scotland was not taking place in a vacuum, rather several jurisdictions across 
Europe were undergoing, or had already undergone, various police reform programmes. In 
Finland, the first set of reforms had taken place in 1996 and coincided with the changes in 
the local government structures. As a result, the concomitant police forces were reduced 
from 229 police districts to ninety local police departments (Haraholma and Houtsonen, 2013: 
59). Subsequent reforms took place in two phases, in 2009 and 2010, resulting in a unified 
police service with one of the stated aims as “to gain productivity savings” (Haraholma and 
Houtsonen, 2013: 60).  
 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, a national police service replacing the previous twenty-five 
semi-autonomous regional police forces came into effect in January 2013 (Terpstra, 2013: 
139). Whilst austerity did not feature strongly in the police reform agenda in the Netherlands, 
there were overall concerns regarding resource and information sharing between the regional 
forces, and the need for a more harmonised administrative structure following a failure of a 
major IT project (Terpstra, 2013: 143-144; Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015: 530).  
 
In 2012, Sweden also embarked on police reform from 21 county police forces to a single 
national police service, and the police authorities, responsible for maintaining the county 
forces were replaced by a centralised police authority, with cost-effectiveness as a key stated 
rationale for the reform (Wennström, 2013: 159).  
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In a stark contrast to the tide of centralisation in Europe, the reform programme in the 
jurisdiction closest to Scotland, also driven by austerity, followed a ‘divergent trend’ (Fyfe 
and Henry, 2012). In England and Wales, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act in 
2011 devolved more powers to local representatives through the newly established role of 
the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and the Police and Crime Panels.  
 
While austerity proved to be the catalyst for police reform in Scotland, the review of the official 
policy discourse above emphasises the reform programme’s focus on strengthening police 
governance, as discussed below.  
Enhanced Police Governance 
Since the Justice Committee hearing in 2008, it was recognised in the official policy circles 
that the governance of the local police forces in Scotland was an issue that needed to be 
addressed, perhaps more so than the reduction in budgets. A senior police officer, also 
involved in the reform agenda had no doubt that the weak governance structures during 
tripartism provided the strongest stimulus for change: 
 
 
The point I would probably just make which is relevant to the question is that one of 
the drivers for change in the first place was a general view or belief that the 
governance arrangements for policing were inadequate. They were weak, and they 
were kind of toothless, and they didn’t provide the kind of clarity or assurance for you 
know government or for the public. (Interview: senior officer, Police Scotland) 
 
A combination of a lack of financial oversight over local police resources, a lack of interest 
by the local police authorities in national policing requirements, and a lack of expertise, skills 
and capacities of the local police authorities were perceived to be crucial weaknesses of the 
tripartite governance arrangements as far as the official reform agenda was concerned.  




The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 introduced statutory duties on local authorities 
to secure ‘best value’ in delivering public services by giving due regard to efficiency, 
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effectiveness, economy and equality (s.1(4)), and to initiate, maintain and facilitate 
Community Planning in consultation with all public bodies responsible for providing services 
locally (s.15). The provisions applied to all functions of local authorities and it was here in 
securing best value and delivering on joint outcomes that the weaknesses of the local police 
authorities were magnified.  
 
Previous HMICS reviews and the Scottish Government had highlighted that local police 
authorities were not effective in providing accountability for the way police resources were 
spent locally in relation to the SOAs and community planning partnerships (Tomkins, 2009: 
39-40; Scottish Government, 2011a: 13, para. 28). Following a joint audit and inspection of 
all eight local police authorities, Audit Scotland and HMICS reported that whilst the local 
police forces were playing an active role in local community planning and delivering local 
outcomes, local police authorities were ‘not effective in their role of influencing local policing 
and partnership priorities and then monitoring development and delivery’ (Audit Scotland and 
HMICS, 2012: 6, para. 15). Further, there was a lack of financial oversight particularly in terms 
of directing police resources towards local priorities (Ibid. p. 6, para. 16). These findings were 
merely a confirmation of what previous inspections and reports had already alluded to. In 
giving evidence to the Justice Committee in 2008, HMICS had argued that ‘there was too 
little direct input or challenge from elected members’ in relation to priority setting of the local 
forces (Justice Committee, 2008: para. 324).  
 
Despite having formal powers of governance, local police authorities were often perceived 
as rubber stamping key decisions (Scott and Wilkie, 2001: 58) and were generally subservient 
to their chief constables. The point was emphasised by a former Minister in relation to the 
powers of local police authorities to allocate funds locally: 
 
The money was basically coming from the centre anyway, it’s not like they previously 
decided how they spent it. They [local authorities] might think that but actually it’s a 
false argument because it wasn’t their money, it was coming from central grants and 
anyway other than the chief saying this is what I would like to spend it on I’ve never 
heard of a councillor saying you’re not spending on that. (Interview: former Minister) 
 
 
The above statement by the former Minister merits a deeper examination of the state of police 
funding prior to reform.  Under the tripartite governance arrangement, the allocation of 
funding to the local police forces was split between central government and local authorities 
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at a ratio of fifty-one per cent central funding and forty-nine per cent local government 
funding. According to a Scottish Parliament briefing (SPICe, 2011), direct central government 
funding was used to fund the SPSA, and to provide additional support to local police forces, 
as well as, for pensions. Central government also made additional contributions to the local 
authorities through ring-fenced police grants making a total contribution of £691.9 million in 
2011/2012, whilst the local authorities contributed £462 million (Ibid. p. 11-12). However, 
around 85 per cent of the local authority expenditure is funded through a Revenue Support 
Grant3 issued by the Scottish Government, with the remainder raised through council tax. 
This additional central government funding is part of the Concordat agreement between the 
Scottish Government and local authorities on joint delivery of services towards key local and 
national outcomes (Scottish Government and CoSLA, 2007). Against the backdrop of the 
Concordat, the lack of oversight over the way police funding was contributing towards local 
and central priorities provided a strong rationale for simplifying financial oversight of the 
police through a centralised governance body. 
 
While the SPA was created to strengthen financial oversight over policing resources, it has 
been severely criticised for ‘poor’ governance and financial mismanagement in the most 
recent audit of its accounts by Audit Scotland (2017).  
National Policing Requirements 
The strongest call for a national strategic body came in 2009 following the HMICS’ 
Independent Review that recommended that ‘Scottish Ministers should bring forward draft 
legislation to impose a statutory duty on chief constables and police authorities to take 
Scotland’s national policing capacity and capability; its national resilience to catastrophic 
events or strategic threats from criminality; and the reduction of the costs that arise from 
unnecessary duplication of services into account in all decision-making’ (Tomkins, 2009: 52, 
para. 8.3). A civil servant noted that it was the HMICS review that had paved the way for the 
creation of the SPB and the SPSA, and even those developments were initially criticised for 
bringing in centralisation: 
 
So the SPB was an attempt to say look we need something where people come 
together at a national level… so there was a definite sense of getting to a point where 
we had the SPB as something that whilst not being a governance structure in the 
formal sense of the word, did provide an opportunity to bring everyone together to 
work at a strategic level… there was quite a lot of opposition to that, it was seen by 
some as being some kind of centralisation. (Interview: civil servant)  
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National risks and policing priorities were perceived to include, but not limited to, ‘counter-
terrorism, specialist firearms support, motorway policing and air support, child protection 
and monitoring sex offenders, serious fraud, armed criminals, kidnap and extortion, the 
infiltration of police organisations by organised crime, cost of technical aids to investigation, 
for example in forensic science, forensic accounting and surveillance techniques, new 
techniques in dealing with large-scale disorder, and additional support to other services 
dealing with threats such as pandemic disease, food contamination and the effects of severe 
weather’ (Tomkins, 2009: 12, para. 2.19; also see Scottish Government, 2011a: 11, para. 24). 
The official policy discourse emphasised that local police authorities were under no obligation 
to consider these requirements when considering priorities for their local police forces.  
 
The move towards a centralised police service and the creation of the SPA sought to 
strengthen the focus on national policing requirements. Research into the current local 
governance structures suggest that the balance has shifted too far towards the centre with 
the 2012 Act creating a ‘structural disconnect’ between centrally shaped policing policies 
having a negative impact on local authorities (Henry et al., 2016: 9-13). To date the SPA has 
not been able to establish an adequate balance between the local and the national (Malik, 
2017a).  
Expertise, Skills, and Capacities  
One of the reasons why the local police authorities were reported to be ineffective in 
delivering financial accountability of the local police forces was due to a lack of professional 
expertise at the disposal of the local councillors. Most local police authorities were perceived 
to have ‘limited dedicated professional support to carry out their functions effectively’ 
(Justice Committee, 2008: para. 352). It was recommended by the Justice Committee that 
the appointment of independent members in an advisory capacity ‘could contribute particular 
professional skills and expertise, professional support and analytical capacity’ (Ibid. para. 
351-353), enabling the local police authorities to scrutinise the performance of their police 
forces effectively. 
 
Concerns regarding the lack of expertise and capacity were particularly raised in respect of 
the reliance of local police authority members on the local police forces to provide information 
that was crucial for the analysis of police performance (Justice Committee, 2008: para. 352). 
Audit Scotland and HMICS, in 2009, also remarked that the local police authority members 
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needed more support to improve their knowledge and understanding of their role as board 
members in order to fulfil their core activities, including setting direction and priorities and 
scrutinising police performance’ (Audit Scotland, 2009: 3, para. 5). An inspection of the 
Strathclyde Police Authority, that maintained the largest police force in the country also found 
that members had ‘limited training, varying levels of understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities and a generally passive, rather than influencing, approach to information from 
the force’ (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 6).  
 
In light of the criticisms of the local police authorities, the SPA was envisioned by its 
architects to bring greater expertise and professional governance skills. However, five years 
since the reform, the SPA continues to lack the expertise and capacity to objectively assess 
and scrutinise the information provided by the police (Malik, 2017b).  
The 2012 Act and police accountability: Missed Opportunities 
Whilst the official reform agenda remained focused on strengthening overall police 
governance, there was a distinct lack of focus on accountability of operational policing. There 
was a sense within the official policy discourse that policing, and the accountability of 
operational policies were not a cause for concern. This was reiterated by a civil servant 
involved in the reform programme: 
 
 
There had not been any issues that had come to light before then, under the prior 
structure, about operational policing, not that I can recall as we speak. So, in a sense 
operational policing, policing delivery, was working very well and these reforms, were 
not about fixing a problem in operational policing, except for, and again very explicit 
about that…that there needed to be better co-ordination of delivery of national 
policing. (Interview: civil servant)  
 
A similar point was made by a senior police officer: 
 
When we went into reform policing was not broken, policing was firing on all cylinders 
we were delivering everything that the communities asked of us, we had made 
significant cost savings before Police Scotland even came into being … Performance 
was very strong across the board, public confidence using all the recognised 
measures was very very strong and in contrast a lot stronger than England. (Interview: 
senior officer, Police Scotland) 
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While traditionally the police forces in Scotland have avoided the heated scandals that their 
counterparts in England have been embroiled in, several controversies related to operational 
policies did exist prior to reform (such as the Paisley College Incident, Gordon, 1980: 80; or 
the criticisms involving the murder inquiry of Surjit Singh Chokar, see Fyfe and Henry, 2012: 
175). However, despite these controversies, it has been argued that the Scottish police 
governance discourse has traditionally lacked “any semblance of accountability” (Lennon 
and Murray, 2016: 11). The lead up to the 2012 Act presented an opportunity for the reform 
team to not only strengthen financial oversight of policing, but also to ensure that the new 
governance arrangements incorporate robust mechanisms for accountability of operational 
policing.   
 
The lack of focus on accountability of operational policing manifested in the most abrasive 
fashion following reform. For instance, Police Scotland’s use of stop and search powers were 
found to be disproportionately targeting young people. Whilst the bulk of the data looked at 
the stop and search rates before the single service, Murray’s research showed that the use 
of non-statutory stop and search had increased markedly under the newly centralised Police 
Scotland (Murray, 2014a). Further, as soon as the new arrangements came into effect, the 
former Chief Constable issued a Standing Firearms Authority, allowing armed police officers, 
attached to the Armed Response Vehicles, to be deployed on routine patrols across 
Scotland. The deployment of armed officers caused considerable controversy, particularly in 
areas with traditionally low levels of crime. This ‘operational policy’ came into effect without 
prior consultation or engagement with the SPA, or indeed the local scrutiny committees. 
Other operational decisions such as the removal of traffic warden support, closures of front 
counter provisions and the raids on Edinburgh’s previously tolerated sex-for-sale saunas, all 
in the first year of the new arrangements, without prior consultations with the SPA, not only 
raised question marks about the effectiveness of the SPA (Scott, 2014; Murray, 2015b; 
Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015) but also highlighted that the new police governance and 
accountability arrangements were inadequate. Whilst the changes in personnel may be 
beneficial in the short term, the weaknesses in the current governance arrangements have 
been underpinned by the SPA’s continued inability to put in place stringent mechanisms for 
the accountability of operational policing (Malik, 2017b). These weaknesses need to be 





This paper, through a chronological review of the official policy agenda developed a nuanced 
understanding of the rationale behind the current structures of police governance and 
accountability, particularly the creation of the SPA. The reforms took place against a 
backdrop of austerity and were driven by the official view that the financial accountability of 
the local police forces was inadequate and that national policing requirements needed 
greater attention. However, the official policy agenda did not seek to strengthen 
accountability of operational policing. Following a lengthy period of consultations, it was 
decided that a structural change was necessary, ensuing a remarkably quick transition to a 
single police service. While the SPA was created to strengthen police governance by bringing 
in greater expertise, five years since reform, the current governance structures, underpinned 
by the SPA’s inability to hold policing to account, remain inadequate. While the SPA 
continues to undergo structural and personnel changes, there is a clear need to revisit the 
purpose and rationale for its creation. In addition to refocusing its attention on financial 
accountability and national governance, the SPA needs to equip itself with greater expertise 
and capacity to provide robust mechanisms for accountability of operational policing. 
 
Notes 
1 As part of the doctoral study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders 
including a former Minister, senior police officers, board members of the SPA, representative from 
HMICS and a civil servant. Interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2016. Unless otherwise 
stated, all interviewees were in post at the time of the fieldwork.   
 
2 In 2007, the Scottish Government and Scottish local authorities (through COSLA) agreed a Concordat 
underpinning a closer working relationship between central and local government. A single outcome 
agreement (SOA) sets out priorities for local outcomes which are agreed between local public services 
and local authorities for each local authority area and the Scottish Government (Christie, 2011: 43-44). 
 
3 A ‘block grant’ funding scheme consists of a Revenue Support Grant, Non-Domestic Rates Income 
and Specific Grants and it is part of a joint service delivery agreement between the Scottish 
Government and local authorities established under a joint Concordat agreement in 2007 (Scottish 
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